In this episode of The Inspector General podcast series, former Department of Defense Inspector General Robert Storch joins me to discuss:
His long and distinguished career in the Inspector General community
What Inspectors General do and why it is important
His thoughts about how Inspectors General can be further empowered to root out waste, fraud, abuse and mismanagement in the programs and operations of our government
This article will examine the evolving attitudes of the United Kingdom (“UK”), European Union (“EU”) and United States (“US”) toward corruption enforcement and will assess whether the UK and EU will be able to plug the potential enforcement gap created by President Trump’s recent Executive Order.
The United States
On February 10, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order titled, ‘Pausing Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement to Further American Economic and National Security’ (the “EO”). As discussed in our previous article, this directs the US Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to pause enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) for 180 days, while the Attorney General reviews the guidelines and policies governing FCPA investigations and enforcement actions.
The EO does not remove all bribery and corruption risks because, among other things and notwithstanding the temporary pause, it does not apply to civil actions brought by the US Securities and Exchange Commission, it does not repeal the FCPA, and the FCPA’s statute of limitations remains five years, which could run longer that the current enforcement pause. However, the EO, in addition to numerous other Executive Orders (which can be found here), highlights a shift in enforcement priorities under the Trump administration, the full effects of which are yet to be seen.
Forced labour and modern slavery have been the subject of renewed focus across the UK and EU in recent months. Below we touch upon key issues relating to the UK Home Office’s update to its statutory guidance on the Modern Slavery Act; the EU ban on products made with forced labour due to come into force in 2027; and the conclusion of the Italian Competition Authority’s recent investigation into fashion brands for misstatements about forced labour.
Update to the UK Home Office’s Statutory Guidance on Supply Chain Transparency
In the UK, companies are subject to the reporting obligations set out in section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (the MSA). The largest commercial organisations (those with a turnover of £36 million or more) must produce and publish an annual modern slavery and human trafficking statement (MSS). These statements should set out the steps taken in the last financial year by an organisation to ensure that slavery and human trafficking are not taking place in its business or supply chain.
In the 10 years since the MSA received Royal Assent, the world’s concept of supply chain transparency reporting has been transformed, leading to criticism that the UK’s reporting regime had not kept pace. In particular, there had been poor monitoring and enforcement of compliance with these requirements, resulting in inconsistency in the quality and effectiveness of such statements. In response to recommendations made by the House of Lords Select Committee on Modern Slavery in October 2024, the UK government published new guidance “Transparency in supply chains: a practical guide” (Guidance) at the end of March 2025. The Guidance offers practical advice to businesses and sets higher expectations on organisations for the contents of their MSS.
On April 7, 2025, U.S. Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche issued a memorandum titled “Ending Regulation by Prosecution” (the “Memorandum”), which set out clear and direct enforcement priorities for the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) relating to digital assets. The Memorandum clarifies that DOJ is not a digital assets regulator and that it will not continue with what it characterizes as the prior Administration’s “regulation by prosecution” strategy. Rather, DOJ will now prioritize enforcement actions that target individual bad actors that use digital assets to perpetuate scams or are engaged in other criminal activity involving digital assets such as organized crime, narcotics, and terrorism. Importantly, the Memorandum scales back the scenarios in which DOJ will pursue enforcement actions against digital asset exchanges or other platforms (e.g., mixers or tumblers) that bad actors may use to conduct illegal activity.
The UAE’s two financial free zones, established in the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, possess their own civil and commercial legal frameworks, inclusive of court systems modeled closely on international standards and principles of common law and, importantly, autonomous financial services regulation. In the Abu Dhabi Global Market (“ADGM”), which was established by UAE Federal Decree No. (15) of 2013, the financial services regulatory authority is the Financial Services Regulatory Authority (“FSRA”). In the Dubai International Finance Centre (“DIFC”), which was established by UAE Federal Decree No. (35) of 2004, the financial services regulatory authority is the Dubai Financial Services Authority (“DFSA”). The FSRA and the DFSA have been and continue to be absolutely committed to maintaining Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”), Combating the Financing of Terrorism (“CFT”) and Counter Proliferation Financing (“CPF”) regimes that significantly deter any criminal elements, including money launderers and persons wishing to support, in any way, acts of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. That commitment includes the rigorous supervision and enforcement of “Rulebooks”, which contain all the regulatory requirements applicable in the respective jurisdictions broken out into “Modules”, such as a “Recognition” Module, a “Conduct of Business” Module, an AML/CFT/CPF-related Module, and more. And in the latest example of their willingness and readiness to take enforcement actions against firms or individuals that violate those Rulebooks, the FSRA and the DFSA recently have imposed substantial fines on financial services businesses in the ADGM and the DIFC for AML/CFT/CPF- and reporting-related noncompliance. We examine those two enforcement actions in this article.
We are pleased to announce a new, quarterly podcast series: “The Inspector General.” Hosted by former State Department and Homeland Security Department Inspector General and partner in our Government Investigations and White Collar practice, Clark Ervin, the podcast is intended especially for government contractors and grantees, who can be the subject of IG investigations and audits. It will also be of interest to those who are part of or who follow the “oversight community.”
The first episode, “A Primer on What Inspectors General are, What They Do, And Why You Should Care,” gives the A-Z on federal Inspectors General – who appoints them; who can remove them; what authorities they have; what work they do; the differences between and among IG investigations, audits, and inspections; what can prompt an IG inquiry; and what can happen as a result of an IG inquiry.
While the United States has announced a pause on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement, the rest of the world is increasing its focus on prosecuting corrupt activities. This is a reminder to companies with a global footprint, including those headquartered in the U.S. that may not have physical operations overseas, that foreign activities likely fall under jurisdictions where foreign bribery and corruption are still enforcement priorities with sizeable penalties.
On March 20, 2025, the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office, France’s Parquet National Financier and the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland announced a new anti-corruption alliance, the International Anti-Corruption Prosecutorial Taskforce, affirming their shared commitment to addressing international bribery and corruption and strengthen cross-border collaboration. The announcement noted that all three countries have wide-reaching anti-bribery legislation with jurisdiction to prosecute criminal conduct, even if that activity occurs overseas, provided there is a link to the prosecuting country. The Taskforce’s founding statement may be found here.
Stay tuned for a more detailed guidance published by our UK, French, and Swiss white-collar teams that will assist global companies to better position themselves to meet the new Taskforce requirements.
The European Commission’s (EC) recent announcement of the Omnibus Simplification Proposals signals that it has heard the challenges and objections raised by companies affected by the new requirements of the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD). But in the US, Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN), a member of the Senate Banking Committee, has introduced legislation that could impose substantial challenges to CSDDD compliance for US companies.
Last month, the UK’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation’s (“OFSI”) published a Threat Assessment analyzing sanctions compliance involving UK financial services firms since February 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine.
In the first of our two-part article (available here), we summarized the six key areas of risk that OFSI identified in its Threat Assessment.
In this concluding part, we consider next steps for UK financial services firms, including performing targeted lookbacks and assessing whether existing sanctions compliance programs and controls are properly attuned to the threats and vulnerabilities that OFSI identified, or whether urgent remediation is necessary.
In February 2025, the UK’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (“OFSI”) issued a report outlining its assessment of the sanctions-related threats posed to the UK by firms operating in the UK’s financial services sector. As to be expected, the report focuses on the risks associated with transactions since February 24, 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine and countries around the world, including the UK, responded with an unprecedented expansion of financial sanctions. However, while OFSI acknowledges that compliance with Russia sanctions must remain a priority for UK financial services firms, it simultaneously makes sure to remind firms that they must strictly comply with all UK sanctions, and many of the insights in the OFSI report are of broader relevance to sanctions compliance.
In our two-part article, we first outline the key threats that OFSI identified in its report, and then we set forth the steps that financial services firms can and should take to address those threats when developing or enhancing their sanctions compliance programs.
